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CURRENT DECISIONS
Torts-LIABILITY FOR THE ENDORSER OF A PRoDucT--Hanberry vu.
Hearst Corp., - Cal. App. 3rd -, 81 Cal. Rptr. 519 (1969).
Plaintiff purchased a pair of shoes relying on an advertisement in
the defendant's magazine and upon its "Guaranty Seal" which was
affixed to the shoes and their container.' She alleged that the shoes
were defective in design and manufacture,2 and that as a result of this
defect she slipped and fell sustaining serious personal injuries. The
plaintiff brought suit against the defendant Hearst alleging inter alia
breach of warranty and negligence.3
Hearst Corporation entered a general demurrer which the trial
court sustained in dismissing the action. The appellate court addressed
itself to the basic question,
whether one who endorses a product for his own economic gain,
and for the purpose of encouraging and inducing the public to buy
it, may be liable to a purchaser who, relying on the endorsement,
buys the product and is injured because it is defective and not as
represented in the endorsement.4
This court justified the imposition of liability on the basis of public
1. With respect to this seal the magazine stated: "This is Good House-
keeping's Consumers' Guarantee" and "We satisfy ourselves that products
advertised in Good Housekeeping are good ones and that the advertising
claims made for them in our magazine are truthful." The seal itself con-
tained the promise, "If the product or performance is defective, Good
Housekeeping guarantees replacement or refund to consumer."
Hanberry v. Hearst Corp, - Cal. App. 3rd -, -, 81 Cal. Rptr. 519, 521 (1969).
2. The plaintiff averred that the shoes had a low coefficient of friction on vinyl and
other types of floor coverings commonly used in the area. Id. at -, 81 Cal. Rptr. at
523.
3. Plaintiff's case was stated in eight causes of action but only the second, third,
seventh, and eighth involved the defendant Hearst. The second and eighth were based
on the theory of negligent misrepresentation. The third alleged that the defendants
conspired to sell shoes through false representations and the seventh was grounded on
either express or implied warranty. Id. at -, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 520-21.
4. Id. at -, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 521.
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policy5 and negligent misrepresentation, 6 but refused to impose liability
on the basis of breach of warranty.7
The development and rapid growth of mass production in industry8
and of products with complex design has brought about changes in the
relationship of the consumer to the producer-seller. What was once
an area dominated by caveat emptor has evolved, through such deci-
sions as MacPherson,9 Henningsen.10 Greenman,"I Vandermark,2 Con-
nor, 3 and Kriegler,4 into one in which the consumer is afforded pro-
5. In voluntarily assuming this business relationship, we think respondent
Hearst has placed itself in the position where public policy imposes upon
it the duty to use ordinary care in the issuance of its seal and certification
of quality so that members of the consuming public who rely on its
endorsement are not unreasonably exposed to the risk of harm.
Id. at -, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 522. In deciding that public policy is sufficient to impose
a duty of reasonable care, the court in Hanberry refers to two prior California cases:
Connor v. Great W. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 69 Cal. 2d 850, 73 Cal. Rptr. 369, 447 P.2d 609
(1968) (savings and loan ass'n held liable to purchasers for the negligent construction
of homes by a builder it was financing) and Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co, 61
Cal. 2d 256, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896, 391 P.2d 168 (1964) (automobile dealer and manu-
facturer liable for injuries sustained as a result of a defective automobile).
6. If either of the alternative allegations is true [the seal was issued without
test, inspection or examination, or upon such test inspection or examina-
tion conducted in a negligent manner] respondent violated its duty of-,care
to the appellant and the issuance of its seal and certification with respect
to the shoes under that circumstance would amount to a negligent
misrepresentation.
Hanberry v. Hearst Corp., - Cal. App. 3rd -, -, 81 Cal. Rptr. 519, 523 (1969). This
conclusion was reached in consideration of RESTATEMENT (SEcoNDm) OF TowRs 5 311
(1966). This section provides a remedy for a party who is injured while acting in
reliance upon information negligently given by another. The negligence may consist
of failure to exercise reasonable care in ascertaining the accuracy of the information
or in the manner in which it is transmitted.
7. See text accompanying note 22 infra.
8. See generally Tobriner & Groden, The Individual and the Public Service Enter-
prise in the New Industrial State, 55 CALIF. L. REV. 1247 (1967).
9. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N. 1050 (1916) (manufacturer
liable to the purchaser of an automobile even though the latter had purchased the
automobile from a dealer and thus there was no privity of contract between purchaser
and manufacturer).
10. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 NJ. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960) (allowed
recovery, against an automobile manufacturer on the grounds of implied warranty and
in the absence of privity).
11. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod., Inc, 59 Cal. 2d 57, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d
897 (1962) (manufacturer of a defective power tool held liable for injuries resulting
from use of the tool on the basis of strict liability).
12. Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co, 61 Cal. 2d 256, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896, 391 P.2d
168 (1964) (manufacturer held liable irrespective of the fact that the dealer was to
make the final inspection).
13. Connor v. Great Western Say. & Loan Ass'n, 69 Cal. 2d 850, 73 Cal. Rptr. 369,
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tection against losses sustained as a result of a defective product. Ex-
pansion in the field of products liability has been toward increasing
both the class of persons upon which liability will attach, and the
class of persons eligible to seek relief for injuries sustained as a result of
a defective product."5
The possibility of extending liability to an independent testing
agency' was judicially considered for the first time in Hempstead v.
General Fire Extinguisher Corp. 7 The court, in denying the defendant
testing company's motion for a summary judgment, held that lia-
bility would exist if the plaintiff could prove, both that Underwriters
was negligent in approving the design of an inherently dangerous
instrument, and that the plaintiff's injury was a result of such negli-
gence.' 8 The court was unable to present any decisional law in support
of this conclusion, but it felt that such a result would be justified by
the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 324A (1965), which provides for
liability to third parties for the negligent performance of an under-
taking.'9
It is of course significant that the liability of an independent tester-en-
dorser can now be established, but it is also worthy of note that these
cases were decided upon various independent grounds. It would ap-
pear from this difference that these courts, at least, have decided that
the imposition of liability upon an endorser is a desirable result, but
that, as in the case of the field of products liability generally, the legal
447 P.2d 609 (1963) (financier held liable for damages resulting from the negligence
of a construction company that it was financing); 10 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 1000 (1969)
14. Kriegler v. Eichler Homes, Inc., 269 Cal. App. 2d 224, 74 Cal. Rptr. 749 (1969)
(strict liability applied to the sale of realty); 11 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 272 (1969).
15. See notes 9-15 supra.
16. See generally Note, Liability of Certifiers of Quality to Ultimate Consumers,
36 NoTE DAmE LAWYER 176 (1961); Note, Tort Liability of Independent Testing
Agencies, 22 RuTGERs L. REv. 299 (1968); Comment, Potential Liability of Non-Manu-
facturer Certifiers of Quality, 10 Virz- L. REv. 708 (1965).
17. 269 F. Supp. 109 (D. Del. 1967). "No decision in Virginia or seemingly elsewhere
has dealt with the issue of the liability of a testing company such as Underwriters."
ld. at 116.
18. Id. at 118.
19. RFsATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324A (1965):
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services
to another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of a
third person or his things, is subject to liability to the third person for
physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to
protect his undertaking, if
(a) his failure to exercise reasonable care increases the risk of such
harm ....
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theory upon which this liability rests remains to be developed on a
case by case basis.
While Hempstead and Hanberry differed as to the specific grounds
for their holdings, they were similar in that they were both based on
the negligence of the tester-endorser. In view of the difficulty en-
tailed for an individual to show negligence on the part of the endorser,
it would seem possible, if not probable, that another court would find
a cause of action existing against an endorser on some grounds other
than negligence.
Although the plaintiff in Hempstead raised only issues which were
based on negligence, 20 the plaintiff in Hanberry asserted both breach
of warranty 2' and negligence. The court, however, rejected the
plaintiff's contentions based on warranty on the grounds that the
plaintiff failed to cite any authority which extended recovery based
on warranty "to one not directly involved in manufacturing products
for, or supplying products to, the consuming public." 22 It also held
that to invoke liability on such grounds would subject Hearst to lia-
bility not justified by the circumstances, and, if the plaintiff were al-
lowed to proceed under warranty, there would be a question as to
whether Hearst had limited its liability to replacement of the product
or refund of the purchase price.28 In light of the court's declaration that
it would be guided more by public policy than by one of the
traditional theories of liability,24 it would seem that the court's ob-
jection to the warranty theory could perhaps be easily overcome.
Although Hearst did not manufacture or directly sell the product
involved, the use of its seal and advertising guarantee was, to a large
extent, responsible for the product being purchased, and this in-
extricably involved Hearst in the marketing process. In such a situation
the endorser should stand on equal footing with the manufacturer and
seller with regards to liability for the guarantees he makes concerning
the product he is attempting to market. As to the court's reasoning that
such liability is not warranted since the endorser only examined or
tested samples and not the specific pair of shoes involved, the endorser
should limit his warranty to those defects arising out of design. His
liability should be dependent upon the nature of the warranty given
20. 269 F. Supp. at 111.
21. - Cal. App. 3rd at -, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 521.
22. Id. at -, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 524.
23. Id.
24. Id. at-, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 521.
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and not the degree of inspection to which he subjects the product. The
limitation of damages to replacement of the product or refund of the
purchase price presents no problem since the Uniform Commercial
Code, adopted in California, considers any limitation of damages for
injury to the person in the case of consumer goods as prima facie un-
conscionable. 5
Although strict liability was not raised by the plaintiff in Han-
berry, the court rejected such a theory as a basis for imposing lia-
bility upon the endorser on grounds similar to those used in rejecting
the breach of warranty theory.2 6 The application of this principle as
a basis for liability is also hindered by the fact that the endorser is
technically not a seller. The Restatement (Second) Torts § 402B2 7 would
afford protection to a consumer in a situation such as Hanberry, pro-
vided the party making the representation was a seller. It would cer-
tainly be arguable that Hearst with its seal of guarantee became so
enmeshed in the marketing of the product, that it should be liable
in the same manner as the manufacturer or retailer would be, had
they misrepresented the product.2 8
An increase in the number of products of complex design has placed
25. CAL. CoMm. CODE § 2719 (3) (West 1964):
Consequential damages may be limited or excluded unless the limitation
or exclusion is unconscionable. Limitation of consequential damages for
injury to the person in the case of consumer goods is prima facie
unconscionable but limitation of damages where the loss is commercial
is not.
26. In rejecting the strict liability theory the court did not use the ground of limita-
tion of damages as was used in the rejection of the warranty theory.
27. REsTATFMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402B (1965):
One engaged in the business of selling chattels who, by advertising,
labels, or otherwise, makes to the public a misrepresentation of a
material fact concerning the character or quality of a chattel sold by
him is subject to liability for physical harm to a consumer of the chattel
caused by justifiable reliance upon the misrepresentation, even though
(a) it is not made fraudulently or negligently, and
(b) the consumer has not brought the chattel from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller.
28. Id. at comment (e) at 360:
The rule stated applies, however, only to those who are engaged in
the business of selling such chattels .... It does not apply, for example,
to a newspaper advertisement published by a private owner of a single
automobile who offers it for sale.
It would be arguable that the above distinction between one engaged in the business
of selling and one not so engaged could be construed so that one who engages in
endorsing a product for his own profit could be considered a seller for the purpose of
imposing liability for the veracity of his endorsement.
1970]
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an increased burden on the ability of the consumer to judge, for him-
self, the quality of the products he will purchase, and thus makes the
role of the independent tester-endorser increasingly more signifi-
cant. As this role enlarges, the duty of care which the independent
tester-endorser owes to the public must increase accordingly.
BRucE E. TiTus
Constitutional Law-TRuSTs-STATE ACTION UNDER THE FouR-
TEENTH AMENDMENT. Evans v. Abney, 90 S. Ct. 628 (1970).
The will of Senator A. 0. Bacon of Georgia conveyed property in
trust to his hometown of Macon, Georgia, to be used as a public park
exclusively for white people. In 1966, the Supreme Court held that the
park could not be operated on a racially discriminatory basis.' Follow-
ing that decision, the Supreme Court of Georgia ruled that since the
testator's intent to provide a park for the exclusive use of white people
had been legally frustrated, the trust must fail, and therefore, the
property by state law 2 must revert to the Senator's heirs.3
The Supreme Court affirmed 4 the Georgia decision on the ground
that the interpretation of wills has always been governed by state law,5
and that the termination of the trust was a proper application of
Georgia's racially neutral trust law." Justice Black, speaking for the
1. Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966). See 52 A.B.A.J. 276 (1966); 8 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 152 (1966).
2. GA. CoDE ANN. §§ 108-06(4) (1959). 'Vhere a trust is expressly created, but ...
[its] uses . . .fail from any cause, a resulting trust is implied for the benefit of the
grantor, or testator, or his heirs." See Adams v. Bass, 18 Ga. 130 (1855) (testator's
intent to settle his slaves in Indiana and Ohio was frustrated by statutes of the latter
states, the government held that cy pres was not applicable and that the testator died
intestate as to his slaves and that a trust resulted for his heirs).
3. Evans v. Abney, 224 Ga. 826, 165 S.E.2d 160 (1968). The Court also found that
the doctrine of cy pres was not applicable as segregation was an essential and
inseparable part of the testator's plan.
4. Evans v. Abney, 90 S. Ct. 628 (1970). Mr. Justice Brennan dissented on the
ground that the closing of the park was the result of discriminatory state action.
Id. at 636. Mr. Justice Douglas dissented on the ground that reversion of the park to
the heirs is less in accord with the Senator's intent than retention of the park by the
city for municipal use. Id. at 635.
5. Id. at 633. See Lyeth v. Hoey, 305 U.S. 189, 193 (1938).
6. See 90 S. Ct. at 631. Other jurisdictions have reached similar results: First
Universalist Society v. Swett, 148 Me. 142, 90 A.2d 812 (1952) (bequest for support
of a specific church that had ceased to exist reverted to testator's estate by virtue
of a resulting trust); Bullard v. Shirley, 153 Mass. 559, 27 N.E. 766 (1891) (bequest to
town for support of a Unitarian clergyman was illegal, therefore the gift failed and
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